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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WEST VALLEY CITY,

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.
KENNETH H. RISLOW,

:

Defendants/Appellant.

Case No. 860332

:

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the district court's affirmance
of a conviction for the offense of Lewdness, a class B misdemeanor, in

violation

of

§13-9-702

Ordinances, in the Fifth Circuit

of

the

West

Valley

Court, West Valley

Revised
Circuit,

Salt Lake County, the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was charged by Information with the offense
of Lewdness, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of §13-9-702
of the West

Valley

Revised

Ordinances.

The

case

before a four member jury on December 18th, 1985.
date, appellant

was

convicted, as charged, by

was tried

On that same

the

jury.

On

January 30, 1986, appellant was sentenced by the circuit court.
On February 7th, 1986, appellant filed a notice of appeal to
the District Court.

After both sides submitted oral and written

argument to Judge Judith

M. Billings, of

the third

judicial

district court, said court affirmed the circuit court judgment
in a memorandum decision dated April 28th, 1986.

After hearing

further argumentf the district court, on May 29th, 1986, issued
a second memorandum decision
opinion.

affirming the April

28th, 1986,

On June 6th, 1986, appellant filed a notice of appeal

with this court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order

from

this court

reversing

the judgment and conviction rendered against him, and remanding
this case to the fifth circuit court for a new trial.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
The issue presented by this appeal is whether appellant
was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel where trial counsel made no attempt to object to the
prosecutor's clearly unreasonable and objectionable argument.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At trial,

the

City's

first

witness

was

Katherine

Loveless, who testified that on May 4, 1985, she was employed
as a secretary at
Mall.

ZCMI, which

(Transcript, pages

is located

35-36)

She

in the Valley Fair

stated

that

she

first

noticed appellant in the early afternoon on that day as he was
walking up the stairs near her desk.

(Tr. 36)

At that time, Loveless noticed that appellant had on
a T-shirt, jogging shorts, and a large utility belt around his
waist.

(Tr. 36)

Also, she noticed that his shorts were "hiked

up on one side", thus exposing a substantial part of his penis
and testicles.

(Tr.

36)

After

2

he

walked

past

her

desk,

appellant then stood in a credit line for a few minutes.
37)

(Tr.

Then, according to Loveless, he walked over to the toy

department, but later came back to her area and picked up a bus
schedule.

(Tr. 37)
Loveless indicated that, after appellant

came back

the second time, she went to get a store security guard.
40)

(Tr.

However, by the time she returned, he had gone into the

restroom.

(Tr. 40)

She indicated that when appellant emerged

from the restroom, the shorts seemed to be pulled up even higher
than before.

(Tr. 41)

The security guard then contacted a

West Valley City police officer, who was in the store investigating a shoplifting incident.

(Tr. 42)

Finally, Loveless testified that a number of people
in the store observed appellant (Tr. 42), but that no one made
an attempt

to

tell

him

that

he

had

a problem.

(Tr. 43)

The City also called, among others, Scott Longson,
who was employed as the store security guard on May 4th.
66)

(Tr.

He indicated that it appeared to him the belt had caused

the pants to be "kind of hiked up".

(Tr. 67)

However, Longson

indicated that he did not mention this problem to appellant.
(Tr. 70)
After the City rested, appellant then took the stand
in his own behalf.

(Tr. 84)

ZCMI that day to pay a bill.

He testified that he had gone to
(Tr. 86)

Appellant further

testified he was not aware of the fact that he was "hanging
out", when he was approached by the police officer.

3

(Tr. 91)

After appellant

testified,

his

trial

counsel

called

three

character witnesses who attested to his reputation for truthfulness and veracity, as well as his good character.

Testimony

was also introduced through opinion evidence relating to truthfulness and good character.

(Tr. 98-117)

In response to appellant's character witnesses, the
prosecutor called his ex-wife, Pamela Richards, to attest to
his lack of veracity

and truthfulness, as well

character.

However, in addition to eliciting testi-

(Tr. 119)

as his bad

mony from her with regard to reputation and character, he also
asked her several questions, over defense counsel's objections,
regarding specific instances of bad conduct and/or other bad
acts.

(Tr. 120)
Specifically, he

asked

her

if appellant

had

ever

"fibbed" to her (Tr. 120)1, if he had failed to pay his income
taxes (Tr. 121-122), if he had fraudulently registered a motor
vehicle (Tr. 122); and was able to elicit a statement from her
that people they had known were afraid of appellant.

(Tr. 123)

It should be noted that the prosecutor did not, at any point,
confront appellant or his character witnesses with any of these
extrinsic facts on cross-examination.
Finally, in closing

argument, the

city prosecutor

1. At this point, trial counsel voiced his objection to any
reference to specific instances of conduct as provided by
Sections 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The
objection was overruled by the Court.

4

made the following

statement, which was not objected to by

trial counsel:
Counsel finally says that he's [appellant]
guilty of being a slop (sic), not lewdness.
I'm sorry. It's more than that. It's much
more than that. Do you want people walking
into the stores where you shop, dressed in
that fashion, dangling their genitalia and
you're going to find them not guilty? See,
that presumption of innocence just went out
the window. It's now time for you to decide
this case. If you want these people walking
around in your stores where you shop, then
you're going to find him not guilty. If
you want to put a stop to it, you're going
to find him guilty. You raised your hand,
an obligation, you swore that you would
well and truly try this case. I'm askinq
you now to do what you agreed to do. (Tr.
173)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The issue here concerns trial counsel's failure to
object to the prosecutor's closing argument, which, appellant
submits, was clearly improper.
failed

to

More important was the fact

that trial

counsel

object

to

this

inflammatory

statement.

This is especially true where the prosecutor had

already been able to introduce other instances of "bad character"
on appellant's part.
Based on these factors, appellant believes that his
trial counsel was ineffective.

Thus, appellant was denied his

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel pursuant
to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution.

5

ARGUMENT
In State v. Andreason,
court reversed
because of

the

a

conviction

prosecutor's

for

718

P.2d

third

improper

400

degree
closing

(1986) f
felony
argument,

Andreasony the prosecutor had argued:
Now, if these two gentlemen were our only
concern, we could probably let them go but
they're not. Ladies and gentlemen, we have
a concern for all of society, we have
concerns if this goes on and that this is
not an isolated incident.
This type of
conduct is pervasive and when we're —
Mr. Mower: I object. I think the prosecutor
is trying to paint the picture that there
are others who are not charaed and who are
not before the Court.
The Court: Objection's overruled.
argument, Counsel.

This is

Mr. Brown: Perhaps the Defense would have
you believe that nobody else is doing it
but they are and every time we have a jury
trial, people are watching.
People are
watching to see how we administer justice
and so, before you determine that there is
some reasonable doubt — and I'm not sure
what it is —
but before you determine
that, you need to consider that we're not —
we've heard a lot about these two Defendants
but they are not the only ones here and
they are not the only ones we need to be
concerned about. We've got to be concerned
about the law.
Now, we give the Defendants a lot of
rights to insure that we never convict an
innocent man but while we're insuring that,
we need to be concerned about how many who
aren't innocent are turned loose and how it
affects them and us but also how it affects
others, others who are going to base their
decisions on conduct and what they know
about how our system works.
So it is a weighty decision but you
need to consider everyone who is involved
here.
6

The court began it's analysis by stating that a twopart test was to be employed in reviewing alleged prejudicial
remarks made

by a prosecutor during

closing

argument.

The

first part of the test considers whether the remarks called the
attention of jurors to matters they would not be justified in
considering in determining

their verdict.

1^3. at 402.

The

second part of the test considers, given a violation of part
one, whether the appellant demonstrated, under the facts of
each particular case, that the jurors were probably influenced
by the

improper remarks

in reaching their verdict.

I_d. at

402-03.
The court then held that part one of the test had
been met.

It stated that:
The jury's attention was clearly called to
matters outside the evidence of the case,
e.g., that defendant's alleged conduct was
"pervasive", that others were involved in
similar conduct, and that the jury needed
to be concerned about those "who aren't
innocent but are turned loose".
Ld. at
402.
As to the second part, the court ruled that because

of circumstantial and sufficiently conflicting evidence in the
case, the jury was probably influenced by the comments.
403.

Id^. at

Thus, the case was reversed and remanded to new trial.
Appellant submits that application of the Andreason

analysis in the instant case would require a reversal if that
issue itself
appeal.
those in

could

have

Clearly, the

been brought before this

statements here

court on

were as offensive as

Andreason, in that it called the jury's attention to

7

others apparently
done.

committing

the

same

acts as appellant had

Further, it appealed to the jury to convict appellant so

as to prevent "these people [from] walkinq around in your stores
where you shop"•
As to the second part of the test, the evidence in
the instant
conflict.

case was also circumstantial and

sufficiently in

The testimony indicated that although appellant was

exposed, no

one

communicated

that

fact

to

him

ascertain his intent and/or lack of knowledge.

in

order

to

Also, appellant

himself testififed that he was not aware he was exposed at the
time.

Appellant submits that because of the marginal nature of

criminal intent

and/or

knowledge, there existed

a reasonable

likelihood that in the absence of the improper argument, there
might have been a different result.

See, State v. Andreason,

supra at 403; State v. Tucker, Utah, 709 P.2d 313, 316 (1985);
State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146 (1981).
Because this case involves an appeal from a conviction
which originated in circuit court, appeal to this court on the
basis of improper prosecutorial comment
this court

has

not

traditionally

involving a

constitutional

lieves that

the constitutional

counsel's failure

to

object

is not proper because

treated

question.

as

one

However, appellant

be-

issue here

to

conduct

this

issue

involves his trial

which orobably

could

have or should have resulted in a mistrial in the instant case.
Therefore, this brief will focus on those cases that deal with
allegations of

ineffective

assistance

8

of

counsel.

Appellant

urges this court, in its analysis to consider the prosecutor's
statements, in

conjunction

with

other

"bad

acts"

evidence

improperly introduced at trial, as contributors to the prejudicial effect that failure to object under the particular circumstances of this case may have had.
In Strickland v. Washington,
S.Ct. 2052, 25 L.Ed.2d

U.S.

, 104

763 (1984) the United States Supreme

Court announced that the following test would

be applicable

with regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:
[T]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
This court has recently established

its own three-

prong test to be applied in determining whether a conviction
should be set aside or reversed based on ineffective assistance
of counsel:
1) The burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendant "and
proof of such must be a demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter". State v.
McNichol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976).
2) A lawyers "legitimate exercise of
judgment in the choice of trial strategy or
tactics that did not produce the anticipated
result does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel". McNichol, supra at
205.
3) It must appear that any deficiency in
the performance of counsel was prejudicial.
In this context, prejudice means that
without counsel's error there was a
"reasonable likelihood that there would
have been a different result."

9

Appellant submits that both

the federal and state

tests are similar in practical effect.

In addition, appellant

submits that his counsel was ineffective under either standard.
Because the state standard is both more substantial and more
specific than

the

federal

standard, analysis

will

be made

pursuant thereto.
Under the first prong of the Codianna test, appellant
submits that he has met his burden of proof in showing that the
error here

is demonstrable

and

not

speculative.

Here, the

trial transcript, on its face, clearly points out the objectionable facts, in addition to his counsel's

failure to object

thereto.
Pursuant to the second prong, it is equally clear
that defense

counsel's

failure

to

object

did

not

involve

legitimate exercise of judgment in the choice of trial strategy.
Certainly, the failure to object to this type of argument at a
point in the trial when defense counsel has completed his case,
cannot possibly be construed to be a strategic-type decision.
The district

court, in its analysis

of

these two

prongs, held that because trial counsel had already objected so
many times at trial, he may have reasonably determined that
further objection

would

cause the

jury to react

adversely.

With all due respect to the district court, appellant submits
that there comes a point where trial strategy must give way to
a clear responsibility to object to something which is so clearly
"out-of-bounds".

In the instant case, this is so.

10

The danger

here is not in possibly alienating the jury.

Rather, it is the

suggestion to the jurors that they may consider prejudicial
matters outside the scope of the evidence that is so critical.
In not objecting, defense counsel permitted the jury to deal
with inflammatory

social and/or moral issues which would be

damaging to any defendant. Failure to object to such statements
simply goes bevond mere trial strategy analysis.
As to the third prong, the likelihood of a different
result without the statements is certainly reasonable.

Again,

in its memorandum decision, the district court stated that the
likelihood of prejudice to appellant was weak "in view of the
substantial competent

evidence

appellant's conviction".

in the record

supporting the

(Memorandum decision, page 15)

Appellant submits that the significant

conflict

in

the evidence, combined with the circumstantial nature of the
city's case, seriously undermines the district court's assertion
that the

evidence

evidence was

was

substantial.

close enough

that any

Appellant
improper

believes the
conduct during

closing argument could have been enough to impact on the jury's
decision.
In State v. Buel, Utah, 700

P.2d

701

(1985), the

appellant had been convicted of aggravated assault and possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person.

Among other

issues raised, appellant argued that his trial counsel had been
ineffective because he failed to object to the admission of a
document which was used to prove that he had been convicted of
a prior felony in Washington.

In holding that appellant had

11

failed to

satisfy

Codianna, the

court

stated

that

counsel's

failure to object to the chain of custody was not improper and
would have been futile anyway.
case, stating

The court then quoted an earlier

that "effective representation does not require

counsel to object when doing so would be futile".

16^. at 703,

quoting State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 59 (1982).
Appellant submits that the instant case can be
distinguished from
objection would

Buel.

have had

In

Buel,

it

no effect

was

since

clear

that

it would

not

the
have

been meritorious. On the other hand, an objection in the instant
case would

have, at

the

very

instruction from the court.

least,

resulted

in a

curative

Further, it could have resulted in

a mistrial based on Andreason, supra.

Certainly, the objection

would not have been futile or without merit.
In State v. White, Utah, 671 P.2d
counsel failed

to subpoena

191

(1983), trial

a witness who she believed

assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.

would

This witness had initially

confessed to the crime which her client was charged with.

In

holding that appellant had failed to prove his counsel had been
ineffective, this court stated:
...the appellant does not establish that
there is any reasonable likelihood that the
jury would have reached a different result
if [the witness] had been subpoenaed and
testified. We have no way of knowing what
[his] testimony would have been. He might
have asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege
or he miqht have testified and denied ever
confessing ... Id_. at 194-195.
Appellant agrees with the court's reasoning in White.
There, the questioned

tactics were

12

such

that one

could

only

speculate as to why

trial counsel

chose not to utilize an

obviously questionable confession. In the instant case, however,
none of the

speculation that

existed

in White

is present.

Rather, the questioned lack of action by trial counsel relates
to a statement actually made by the prosecutor in the jury's
presence.

Further, this statement was made after the evidence

introduced at trial had already

included

negative character

evidence which the district court even believed was erroneously
admitted.

(District Court memorandum decision, paqe 7)

This

case simply presents that rare situation where, under its unique
facts, the probability of prejudice arisinq from a statement as
was made was likely. Counsel's failure to object at that particular time

cannot

ineffective under

be attributed
any

standard

to mere
and

strategy.

appellant

is

It was
therefore

entitled to a new trial.
Finally, this

court,

in

State v. Frame, Utah, 723

P.2d 401 (1986) has defined "reasonable probability" "as that
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the
verdict".

at 405, quoting State v. Lairby, Utah, 699 P.2d 1187

at 1204-06 (1984).
of this case.

This prong, appellant submits is the crux

Because

it appears clear that trial counsel

should have, under the facts of this case, objected to the
improper remarks, the guest ion then concerns the "reasonable
probability" that the statements and the lack of objection were
sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the
verdict.

13

Again, the prosecutor was able to improperly introduce
evidence that appellant had lied to his ex-wife, failed to pay
income taxes, fraudulently registered
violent.

Although

these

a motor vehicle and was

improprieties

are

not

before

this

court on appeal, one must look at these facts in conjunction
with the

statement

to

see

that

confidence

in

the

reliability must necessarily be greatly undermined.
of the jury looking

verdicts

The danger

at appellant as a bad person in light of

the character evidence and the prosecutor1s plea to the jury to
make a moral judgment rather than one based only on the facts
of this case was obvious.

This danger was not

like in White, it was real.

speculative,

Therefore, appellant is entitled

to a new trial•
CONCLUSION
Based on the above argument, which demonstrates that
trial counsel was ineffective, appellant's conviction should be
vacated and reversed with an order to the circuit court for a
new trial.
Dated this

day of November, 1986.

RONALD J. YENGICH

EARL XAIZ
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was mailed/delivered to the Spence Robinson, Assistant
West Valley City Prosecutor, 2470 South Redwood Road, West Valley
City, Utah, 84119, on this

day of October, 1986.
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